Production Liability by Bagchi, Aditi
Fordham Law Review 




Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Aditi Bagchi, Production Liability, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 2501 (2019). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol87/iss6/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 






It is well known that many consumer goods are produced under dangerous 
working conditions.  Employers that directly supervise the production of 
these goods evade enforcement.  Activists and scholars have argued that we 
must hold the manufacturers and retailers that purchase goods made in 
sweatshops accountable.  However, there has been little movement toward 
such accountability. 
Responsibility for the conditions under which goods are made—what I call 
“production liability”—entails assigning responsibility for workers to firms 
that do not directly employ them.  Production liability, therefore, conflicts 
with deep intuitions about the boundaries of individual responsibility. 
This Article offers a moral and economic defense of production liability 
that is responsive to that challenge.  The Article identifies the particular 
moral responsibility that manufacturers bear as a public form of complicity.  
It further considers the economic logic of assigning legal liability to such 
firms and the optimal form that liability should take.  This Article makes the 
case that production liability can update our legal regime for employment in 
the way that products liability did for consumer law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Americans are periodically shocked to read about the horrific conditions 
under which a variety of retail goods are manufactured, especially our 
clothing.  But we do not sustain our shock in sufficient numbers to alter those 
conditions through reduced consumer demand.  Well-known corporations 
have taken steps to improve working conditions at their suppliers’ factories, 
but these efforts have been mostly ineffectual.1 
Factory working conditions in industries like the garment industry are a 
well-known and long-standing problem.  Our limited progress can be 
explained in two obvious ways.  First, improving working conditions for 
workers comes at someone’s expense.  Whether those potential payors are 
corporations or consumers, they have more political clout than the workers 
whose health and safety are at issue.  Second, the enforcement of laws 
intended to improve working conditions is costly.  The result is that workers’ 
interests in health and safety compete not just with the interests of those with 
a stake in cheap production but with the many other worthy beneficiaries of 
government spending.  Enforcing employment law rivals a myriad of other 
public spending priorities. 
These constraints on any solution to the seemingly intractable problem of 
poor working conditions are daunting, but they may explain less than they 
appear to do.  Many legal enforcement regimes advance the interests of one 
group at the expense of other, more politically powerful groups.  And it is 
true of every government spending priority that it comes at the expense of 
other budget items.  More must be said to explain our lack of progress on the 
specific problem of dangerous production. 
One important obstacle is conceptual.  We have thus far regulated 
employment conditions by regulating employers.  But the employers of 
workers who manufacture many consumer goods, especially clothing, are 
almost outside the reach of the law.2  The actors in the supply chain who are 
 
 1. See generally RICHARD M. LOCKE, THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER:  
PROMOTING LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2013) (describing the difficulties that 
Nike faces in attempting to improve supplier working conditions). 
 2. See infra Part I. 
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in the best position to improve working conditions and who are within the 
reach of the law are firms that purchase goods from suppliers,3 with only 
suppliers directly employing the workers whose safety is at issue.  We have 
failed to regulate lead firms not only due to a lack of political will, as many 
worker advocates have assumed, but also because there is genuine 
uncertainty about whether we are justified in assigning legal responsibility 
for working conditions to persons with no direct relationship with the 
workers.  Absent a cogent theory of lead firm responsibility—or what I will 
call “production liability”—pinning legal liability on lead firms seems 
arbitrary, opportunistic, and perhaps inconsistent with basic principles of 
fairness and efficiency in our larger legal system. 
This Article aims to provide the moral and economic logic that links lead 
firms with their suppliers’ employees.  The discussion centers on the garment 
industry, though the analysis and conclusions are intended to apply to other 
industries with similar market structures.  The focus on safety violations does 
not directly address the related challenges of unpaid wages and low wages, 
but it should generate some insight into those problems, too. 
This Article encompasses the matter of working conditions in the factories 
of domestic and foreign subcontractors.  Although their legal situations are 
importantly distinguishable, because domestic and overseas suppliers are, to 
a large extent, substitutes for one another, any reform that targets one without 
the other is unlikely to be effective.4  One of the advantages of the legal 
course that this Article ultimately endorses is that it will not substantially 
skew lead firms’ choice of suppliers. 
Early on, this Article concludes, as other commentators have, that supplier-
contractors are themselves largely ungovernable.5  It is an alarming 
conclusion, but it shows the extent to which the problem we are addressing 
is not just a humanitarian problem, but a challenge to the rule of law.  
Suppliers in the garment industry frustrate the possibility of effective private 
recourse, and they are too numerous and short-lived to be subject to effective 
government oversight.  For this reason, commentators—including this one—
consistently arrive at the conclusion that some kind of liability for lead firms 
is necessary to improve working conditions in their suppliers’ factories.  
Notwithstanding the widespread view among scholars that working 
conditions cannot be effectively regulated without regulating lead firms, 
there has been no attempt to systematically study the philosophical and 
economic bases for assigning liability to lead firms and, accordingly, no 
 
 3. This Article refers to the companies that buy goods from suppliers as “lead firms,” 
which include both recognizable brands that retail their wares directly and manufacturers that 
distribute their goods through retail intermediaries. 
 4. Production has shifted overseas but at times it has also shifted back, suggesting that 
fluctuating transaction costs can overwhelm any fundamental difference in factory prices. See 
Dennis Hayashi, Preventing Human Rights Abuses in the U.S. Garment Industry:  A Proposed 
Amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 195, 197 (1992) (explaining 
that the trend toward foreign production in the garment industry was reversed in the early 
1990s due to “uncertain political conditions abroad, increased labor costs, poor workmanship, 
and problems associated with moving goods quickly”). 
 5. See infra Part I. 
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satisfactory answer to the question of what form production liability should 
take.  This Article takes on these open questions. 
The concept of production liability is intended to invoke the apparently 
quite distinct doctrine of products liability.6  Products liability concerns 
manufacturer liability to consumers for defects in products, even where those 
products are purchased from third parties.7  The legal concept of privity 
initially barred manufacturer liability for product defects because 
manufacturers do not stand in any direct relationship with consumers; their 
relationship is mediated by distributors and retailers.8  It took a revolution in 
tort law to establish that manufacturers owe a duty of care directly to 
consumers irrespective of the transactional chain that brings products into 
consumer hands.9 
The shadow of privity—at least, the underlying legal impulse to require a 
direct “relationship” between wrongdoers and victims—has also 
substantially impaired the case for manufacturer liability for the working 
conditions under which goods are produced.  Garment manufacturers do not 
usually stand in any direct contractual relationship with the workers who 
produce their goods.  Most important, they do not employ those workers 
directly.  Their relationship is mediated by suppliers who employ workers to 
produce goods and then sell those goods to manufacturers.  Just as the legal 
system of accountability for defective products had to update to account for 
modern systems of mass production and distribution, so too must our system 
of accountability for working conditions.  I do not expect that the rules and 
regulations by which we establish production liability will track products 
liability, nor will their histories run in parallel.  Furthermore, I do not 
advocate judicial leadership or revision of fundamental common-law 
doctrines.  Nevertheless, products liability and production liability each 
represent a new category of legal responsibility that is responsive to modern 
economic institutions and which historic common law and more modest 
regulatory tweaks have failed to recognize.  Products liability ushered in a 
fundamental change in the principles of tort law; outdated intuitions about 
the boundaries of responsibility still rooted in an abandoned tort-law regime 
may be the greatest hurdle to establishing production liability today. 
The discussion in this Article proceeds in several Parts.  Part I provides 
some background on the problem of supplier working conditions.  It also 
offers an account of the inadequacy of the present legal regime, which is 
intended to parallel earlier frustrations with the requirements of privity and 
 
 6. See infra Parts I, IV.A. 
 7. See Products Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 8. Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 44, 44 (1955); see also, e.g., 
Abercrombie v. Union Portland Cement Co., 205 P. 1118, 1119 (Idaho 1922) (denying 
recovery to plaintiff who had no “contractual relation” with the manufacturer it sued). 
 9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (“One 
engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a 
defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.”); 
id. § 1 cmt. c (“The rule stated in this Section applies . . . to manufacturers and other 
commercial sellers and distributors . . . .”); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 352 
(2000); DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW §§ 1.1–.2 (2005). 
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fault in the context of products liability.  Those frustrations gave way to the 
products liability regime that exists today.  I will explore the fruits and limits 
of the analogy between products liability and production liability throughout 
the remainder of the Article. 
Part II argues that moral responsibility is properly borne by lead firms 
because they have control over supplier working conditions and can foresee 
those conditions as consequences of their own contractual terms with the 
suppliers.  Although their “outcome responsibility” is not exclusive, it is a 
sufficient basis for the assignment of legal liability, which after all would not 
be exclusive under any proposed regime either. 
It is not ultimately compelling to claim that the contracts that lead firms 
enter with suppliers are themselves direct wrongs against the suppliers’ 
workers.  However, because those contracts make worker abuse likely, lead 
firms are complicit in the moral wrong of hazardous working conditions that 
suppliers perpetrate directly.  The wrongdoing of lead firms is better 
conceived as a public wrong that undermines just institutions rather than as 
a private wrong against their supplier’s employees.  This last point informs 
the legal form that production liability should take. 
Part III argues that liability for lead firms is not only morally defensible, 
but it is also economically advisable.  Such firms are best placed to bear the 
risk of poor working conditions.  Specifically, they are in the best position to 
deter violations and to distribute the costs of ameliorating those risks, and 
they are the cheapest point of legal enforcement. 
Part IV considers the choice between private and public enforcement.  That 
is, whether it is better to create private rights of action against lead firms, or 
whether it is preferable to place the authority to enforce lead firms’ 
responsibility solely in the hands of administrative agencies.  While fully 
cognizant of the many limitations of the regulatory approach, this Article 
recommends government enforcement.  There are several avenues, however, 
by which the prospect of government enforcement will give rise to 
complementary private enforcement, even absent private rights of action by 
the employees of subcontractors.  Part IV also considers the appropriate 
standard of liability.  The conceptual standard this Article proposes is a 
hybrid of strict and fault-based liability.  Lead firms should be responsible 
for working conditions that fail to meet government standards irrespective of 
whether any actual injuries have resulted and without inquiry into the details 
of their own conduct, including their contractual terms with suppliers and 
their performance of those contracts. 
Production liability has been a timely topic for a long time.  That is, though 
the policy concerns that it targets have long been on select political and 
scholarly agendas, scattershot litigation and legislative efforts have failed to 
make significant headway.  There are, of course, substantial economic 
interests with political clout that would stand to lose from the implementation 
of production liability, and this Article does not take full account of those 
headwinds. 
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This Article’s primary aim is not to explore the political prospects for 
production liability; rather, it will explain its regulatory logic.  Nevertheless, 
political constraints figure into the analysis at two levels.  First, like any 
meaningful discussion of potential reform, the foregoing discussion is 
cognizant of institutional constraints.  This Article takes into account the 
costs and probable efficacy of different measures, were they to be adopted.  
For example, it presumes that any administrative agency charged with 
enforcement of a relevant rule will be underfunded.  Second, and more 
fundamentally, the prospects for production liability turn at least in part on 
the intelligibility of any proposed model, including its moral and economic 
underpinnings and its fit with existing legal concepts and institutions.  This 
Article aims to offer an account of production liability that coheres with our 
prevailing normative commitments in that way. 
I.  SUPPLY CHAINS AND WORKING CONDITIONS 
What exactly is the problem?  Sweatshops, in a word.  Sweatshops are 
small factories that produce goods (again, this Article focuses on garments) 
that are in turn sold to a lead firm.10  The lead firm either retails the goods 
directly or sells them through a distributor, such as a department store.11  The 
lead firm has a recognizable brand name, but there are about twenty small 
suppliers for every manufacturer (in some cases, thousands more), and no 
one has heard of the suppliers.12 
There is nothing inherently objectionable about such a market structure; 
the lead firms are not so few as to raise immediate concerns about their 
market power.  However, suppliers are undercapitalized and operating on the 
tightest margins, in substantial part due to the fierce competition among 
them.  They essentially sell labor, and there is little room to creatively 
improve productivity relative to competitors.13  They are said to “sweat” out 
a profit from their workers, who are paid little and sometimes go unpaid.14  
Most of their employees are unskilled and are provided little training, so there 
are few costs associated with high turnover in an abundant labor pool.  Many 
domestic garment workers are non-English speaking or undocumented;15 
their reluctance to seek clarification of instructions exacerbates workplace 
risks;16 and their reluctance to report unsafe conditions to public authorities 
compromises enforcement that is already shoddy.17  The result is that more 
 
 10. See Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747, 
756–57 (2014) (describing the fragmentation of the supply chain); see also Shirley Lung, 
Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine:  Providing a Break for Sweatshop Garment Workers, 
34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 291, 302 (2003). 
 11. See Parella, supra note 10, at 756–57. 
 12. See id.; see also Lung, supra note 10, at 302. 
 13. Hayashi, supra note 4, at 204. 
 14. Andrew Herman, Reassessing the Role of Supplier Codes of Conduct:  Closing the 
Gap Between Aspirations and Reality, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 445, 471 (2012). 
 15. Jayesh M. Rathod, Danger and Dignity:  Immigrant Day Laborers and Occupational 
Risk, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 813, 823–24 (2016). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. at 824. 
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than half of the garment factories in the United States violate labor laws.18  
These workplaces are shockingly unsafe, from their production practices to 
the physical integrity of the buildings in which they operate.19  These facts 
hold with respect to both domestic contractors and overseas contractors.  
Neither workers nor agencies that sue domestic contractors consistently 
recover damages or fines because contractors are often judgment-proof or 
declare bankruptcy.20  Workers are unable to collect from subsequent 
businesses that the contractor might open under a different name.21 
Although the relative shares of domestic and foreign production shift over 
time, the domestic share of production has fallen considerably in the last two 
decades.  Factory jobs in Los Angeles, where the domestic garment industry 
was centered, have decreased by nearly two-thirds in the last decade.22  There 
also used to be as many as 30,000 garment workers in New York City in the 
1980s and 1990s, but only a few thousand remain today.23  Across the United 
States, the number of persons employed in the apparel-manufacturing 
industry has dropped by almost four-fifths since 1990.24 
Over the last two decades, the Asia Pacific region has become the 
dominant source of garments, textiles, and footwear.  In 2014, it exported 
almost 60 percent of such goods, mostly from China.25  This shift was in part 
propelled by the lapse of the Multifiber Agreement, an international trade 
agreement that set quotas for the amount of textiles and garments that 
developing countries could deliver to developed countries.26  China has also 
improved its trade position via the adopted 2001 World Trade Organization 
China accession agreement.27  But most obviously, the vast wage differences 
between developed and developing countries explain the shift in production, 
 
 18. Lung, supra note 10, at 293, 296–98 (describing the scope of the unpaid-wages 
problem among contractors in the United States). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 305. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Joel Kotkin & Michael Shires, The Cities Leading a U.S. Manufacturing Revival, NEW 
GEOGRAPHY (July 24, 2015), http://www.newgeography.com/content/005003-the-cities-
leading-a-us-manufacturing-revival [https://perma.cc/8PVV-SLEA]. 
 23. Ke Xu, Union Urges Garment Workers to Purchase ‘Obamacare,’ VOICES N.Y. (Dec. 
19, 2013), https://voicesofny.org/2013/12/union-urges-garment-workers-to-purchase-
obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/7T4T-EJ4H]. 
 24. All Employees, Thousands, Apparel, Seasonally Adjusted, BUREAU LAB. STAT., 
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CES3231500001?amp%253bdata_tool=XGtable&output_vie
w=data&include_graphs=true [https://perma.cc/F4T6-W9PC] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 25. INT’L LABOUR ORG., WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE GARMENT SECTOR IN ASIA AND 
THE PACIFIC AND THE ARAB STATES 1 (2016), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_534289.pdf [https://perma.cc/wm9h-ha4z]. 
 26. See Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles:  General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001.  
 27. World Trade Organization, Decision of 10 November 2001, Protocol on the Accession 
of the People’s Republic of China, WTO Doc. WT/L/432 (2001); see also Jordan Weissmann, 
Waking the Sleeping Dragon, SLATE (Sept. 28, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://slate.com/ 
business/2016/09/when-china-joined-the-wto-it-kick-started-the-chinese-economy-and-
roused-a-giant.html [https://perma.cc/RX34-3TT3].  
2508 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
with labor costs in South and Southeast Asia sometimes equaling just 
6 percent of labor costs in the United States.28 
Workers at overseas suppliers may be formally entitled to sue their 
employers, too, but their home legal systems are often ill-equipped to handle 
such cases.  Working conditions at supplier factories may not be very 
different from other local workplaces.  Given the importance of attracting 
foreign income, enforcing local employment protections against suppliers is 
often not a priority.  The sheer number of suppliers, here and abroad, makes 
government enforcement a formidable task in any event.29  The result is that 
overseas suppliers, like their American counterparts, operate in violation of 
local worker safety ordinances with impunity. 
Workplace safety is traditionally the responsibility of employers.  Even if 
suppliers are difficult to regulate as employers, why look to lead firms, in 
particular, as an alternative?  This Article analyzes the moral and economic 
basis for their liability in depth in subsequent Parts.  But the push for 
production liability is mysterious without understanding the inadequacy of 
the present legal regime and the potential that lies in lead firms. 
The appeal of lead firms as a point of enforcement is easily stated.  Lead 
firms have substantial bargaining power vis-à-vis suppliers.30  They are in a 
position to demand alterations to the workplace.31  On the other hand, they 
are also in a position to exact contract terms that make it impossible for 
suppliers to comply with safety regulations while remaining profitable.32  
Indeed, labor abuses are more common during the peak seasons of the 
clothing industry because of the tight schedule to which suppliers are subject 
at those times.33 
In specific cases, lead firms that were subjected to intense, negative 
publicity after a tragedy or investigation at a supplier location have taken 
measures to substantially improve working conditions at their suppliers.34  
However, these measures have never been adopted on an industry-wide scale. 
 
 28. DAMIAN GRIMSHAW & RAFAEL MUÑOZ DE BUSTILLO, GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 
ON WAGE FIXING INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR IMPACTS IN MAJOR GARMENT PRODUCING 
COUNTRIES 54 (2016), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/ 
documents/publication/wcms_558636.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7DE-FZSG]. 
 29. See Timothy P. Glynn, Taking the Employer Out of Employment Law?  Accountability 
for Wage and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 201, 204 (2011). 
 30. Most contractors in the garment industry have limited bargaining power because they 
lack business experience, education, language skills, and capital. See Hayashi, supra note 4, 
at 200. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See Glynn, supra note 29, at 214 & n.59; see also Scott L. Cummings, Hemmed In:  
Legal Mobilization in the Los Angeles Anti-Sweatshop Movement, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 1, 15–16, 43–44 (2009). 
 33. See Sean Cooney, A Broader Role for the Commonwealth in Eradicating Foreign 
Sweatshops?, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 290, 296 n.22 (2004). 
 34. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, Transnational Corporations’ Outward Expression of 
Inward Self-Constitution:  The Enforcement of Human Rights by Apple, Inc., 20 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 805, 836–47 (2013) (describing the pressure on Apple and the 
subsequent monitoring efforts it has undertaken); Douglass Cassel, Corporate Initiatives:  A 
Second Human Rights Revolution?, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1963, 1969 (1996) (describing the 
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Labor rights activists and employment scholars have pursued four main 
avenues to hold lead firms accountable:  (1) direct claims by workers against 
lead firms, (2) regulations that outlaw goods produced under wrongful 
conditions, (3) consumer misrepresentation claims, and (4) voluntary 
corporate codes. 
First, proponents of production liability have argued that lead firms are 
“employers,” that they owe direct duties of care to contractors’ employees, 
or both.  The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),35 which applies only to 
domestic employees, defines “employment” broadly in what the Act’s 
legislative history suggests may have been a deliberate effort to encompass 
manufacturers.36  But courts have only rarely held lead firms accountable 
under the Act. 
In Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,37 the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the determination of a person’s status as an employee turns on “the 
circumstances of the whole activity,” which seemed to invite varied criteria 
across jurisdictions.38  Some courts use a definition heavily influenced by 
common-law control criteria.39  Lead firms’ lack of direct physical control 
over suppliers’ workers is usually enough to avoid liability under that 
standard.40  Other courts emphasize “economic reality” and ask whether 
work performed by the ostensible employee is part of an “integrated 
economic unit.”  Courts sometimes question whether the intermediate 
contractor had an opportunity to bargain with the proposed employer-
manufacturer.  Some courts applying this standard also ask which party 
dominated decision-making over essential determinants of profits in a 
business.41  This approach is more hospitable to U.S. workers who want to 
sue a lead firm,42 but “[c]ourts decide rather arbitrarily which factors to 
 
measures taken by Gap in response to negative publicity surrounding supplier working 
conditions in El Salvador); see also Harry Arthurs, Corporate Self-Regulation:  Political 
Economy, State Regulation and Reflexive Labour Law, in REGULATING LABOUR IN THE WAKE 
OF GLOBALISATION 19, 20–24 (Brian Bercusson & Cynthia Estlund eds., 2008). 
 35. 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2012). 
 36. See Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American 
Sweatshop:  Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 
1003–05 (1999). 
 37. 331 U.S. 722 (1947). 
 38. Id. at 730. 
 39. See, e.g., Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1994); Wheeler 
v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 268–75 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 40. See, e.g., Xue Zhen Zhao v. Bebe Stores, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 
2003).  In Xue Zhen Zhao, a California district court found that a manufacturer was not a joint 
employer.  The supplier in that case performed work for multiple manufacturers, owned the 
factory and equipment that workers used, employed its own supervisors, and controlled 
workers’ pay and hours. Id. at 1155–56. 
 41. See, e.g., Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 639–42 (9th Cir. 1997); Real v. Driscoll 
Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 42. See Lopez v. Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405, 419–21 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (considering a 
range of factors to find garment workers economically dependent and to extend employer 
liability to a manufacturer). 
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employ and, without articulated interpretive frameworks to guide their 
decisions, courts oscillate between different versions of the factors.”43 
There have been a few successes in the effort to hold lead firms 
accountable as employers under the FLSA.  Most notably, in Ling Nan Zheng 
v. Liberty Apparel Co.,44 the Second Circuit upheld a jury’s finding that a 
New York garment manufacturer was the plaintiffs’ joint employer.45  The 
court considered several factors:  (1) whether workers used the 
manufacturer’s premises and equipment; (2) whether the contractor had a 
business that could or did shift as a unit from one putative joint employer to 
another; (3) the extent to which workers performed a discrete line job that 
was integral to the manufacturer’s process of production; (4) whether 
responsibility under the contracts could pass from one contractor to another 
without material changes; (5) who supervised the workers; and (6) whether 
workers worked exclusively or predominantly for the manufacturer.46  Ling 
Nan Zheng demonstrates that production liability may be doctrinally 
attainable by way of the FLSA.47  However, its test has proven to be a high 
hurdle for plaintiffs and there has been no shift in the direction of treating 
lead firms as joint employers of their suppliers’ workers.  While recent cases 
suggest that courts may be wary of corporations’ efforts to classify workers 
as independent contractors to avoid employer responsibilities,48 there is no 
indication that courts will designate workers as employees of a firm when 
those workers are already clearly employees of a different firm. 
Even if it were possible to hold lead firms accountable for conditions of 
domestic production under the FLSA, overseas workers cannot sue under the 
Act.49  Those workers also cannot rely on any amorphous common-law duty 
of care that the FLSA might be regarded as codifying with respect to some 
subset of workers.  In one notable suit, overseas workers sued Wal-Mart, 
arguing that it had breached a duty of care owed to them by failing to 
adequately monitor its suppliers’ working conditions.50  The court said that 
the existence of any duty of care was a policy question and declined to 
 
 43. See Lung, supra note 10, at 325. 
 44. 389 F. App’x 63 (2d Cir. 2010).  A district court in New York in an earlier case had 
found “genuine issues of material fact as to whether and to what degree [the defendant 
manufacturer] supervised [the contractor’s employees’] work.” Fen X. Chen v. St. Beat 
Sportswear, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 2d 269, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 45. Ling Nan Zheng, 389 F. App’x at 66. 
 46. See generally id. 
 47. See generally id. 
 48. See generally O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015); 
Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018). 
 49. Section 213(f) of the FLSA specifically states that it will “not apply with respect to 
any employee whose services during the workweek are performed in a workplace within a 
foreign country.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (2012). 
 50. Aaron J. Schindel & Jeremy Mittman, Workers Abroad, Trouble at Home:  
Multinational Employers Face Growing Liability for Labor Violations of Overseas Suppliers, 
19 NYSBA INT’L L. PRACTICUM 40, 40 (2006).  See generally Class Action Complaint for 
Injunctive Relief and Damages, Jane Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., No. BC339737 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. filed Sept. 13, 2005). 
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recognize any such duty running from lead firms to suppliers’ workers.51  It 
dismissed the suit,52 and the prospects for any subsequent claims by overseas 
workers against U.S. lead firms appear dim. 
Overseas employees of suppliers are also unable to bring suit against lead 
firms under other statutes that do not depend on designating lead firms as 
employers or establishing a direct relationship between lead firms and 
employees.  Overseas workers cannot bring suit under the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS)53 unless they allege a violation of a norm that was specific, universal, 
and obligatory as of 1789, when the law was enacted.54  The Court expressed 
great reluctance to recognize any new private claims.55  Most unsafe working 
conditions—let alone contracting with the direct operator of a facility with 
such conditions—probably would not amount to a violation of long-standing 
international law.56  Nor is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations (RICO) Act57 a promising avenue of recourse for overseas 
workers.  Although one district court found that a contractual relationship 
between a retailer and supplier can provide sufficient facts to state a RICO 
claim, the court ultimately dismissed the RICO claim at hand, finding that 
the allegations did not establish that the defendant retail brands participated 
in the alleged enterprise.58  In 2016, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit 
split and allowed some extraterritorial application of RICO, but only where 
the predicate conduct is itself a violation of a statute with extraterritorial 
application.59 
Direct liability to workers has had little legal traction notwithstanding a 
significant grassroots movement to hold lead firms accountable.  It is their 
work that is the impetus for taking seriously the problem of sweatshop 
workers.60  Organizations like the Institute for Global Labour and Human 
 
 51. Jane Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-7307 AG (MANx), 2007 WL 
5975664, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007) (explaining that the “duty Plaintiffs seek to enforce 
would be a duty of a retailer to be reasonably careful when contracting with suppliers to 
prevent intentional labor violations by those suppliers” but rejecting this view because 
“Plaintiffs’ negligence claims go well beyond the recognized limits of liability”), aff’d, 572 
F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 52. Id. at *7–8. 
 53. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
 54. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–33 (2004). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. at 712–13 (limiting ATS private rights of action to claims that are universally 
recognized as arising out of the law of nations); Melissa Torres, Labor Rights and the ATCA:  
Can the ILO’s Fundamental Rights Be Supported Through ATCA Litigation?, 37 COLUM. J.L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 447, 464–67 (2004) (noting that the ATS does not enable enforcement of all 
fundamental labor rights because those right are not considered a part of customary 
international law). 
 57. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012). 
 58. Doe I v. Gap, Inc., No. CV-01-0031, 2001 WL 1842389, at *8 (D. N. Mar. I. Nov. 26, 
2001) (“As noted above, the allegations adequately show an opportunity for the retailer 
defendants to participate in the enterprise.  However, for the reasons given below, the 
allegations purportedly showing that the retailer defendants actually did participate in the 
enterprise are insufficient to constitute . . . ‘participation’ [under the RICO Act].”). 
 59. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2104 (2016). 
 60. Cummings, supra note 32, at 18–19, 43–44 (describing several grassroots campaigns); 
Andrew Elmore, Comment, State Joint Employer Liability Laws and Pro Se Back Wage 
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Rights and the Worker Rights Consortium monitor factories, conduct 
research, and attempt to garner public support to pressure brands to fix 
problems in specific factories.61  Nevertheless, the specific aim of holding 
lead firms directly responsible to supplier employees has made little legal 
progress.  Even if the case law were gradually to turn toward a finding of 
control by lead firms, companies are as likely to distance themselves from 
suppliers as they are to improve working conditions throughout their supply 
chain.62 
A second strategy for worker advocates has been public regulation.  The 
so-called “hot goods” provision of the FLSA allows the government to seize 
any goods that were manufactured in violation of labor laws.63  The Obama 
administration used this provision more rigorously than previous 
administrations.64  There also have been several local, regional, and sector-
specific efforts to use the provision to enforce labor standards.65  In principle, 
authority to seize hot goods would operate as a strict liability regulation in 
that it does not depend on establishing the present owner’s fault for the 
conditions under which goods were produced.  It thus avoids the high costs 
that worker representatives face when attempting to establish lead-firm 
control over particular supplier factories.  However, the hot goods provision 
is more limited than it appears at first blush.  It exempts both common carriers 
and “good faith purchasers” of goods who were unaware of the illegal 
conditions of production.66  A 2014 fact sheet from the Department of Labor 
further clarified that goods on retailers’ shelves or in consumer hands are not 
illegal because they are no longer in the flow of commerce.67  No doubt, even 
within these legal parameters, there are many hot goods that could be seized 
but are not simply because enforcement officers are woefully underfunded 
 
Claims in the Garment Industry:  A Federalist Approach to a National Crisis, 49 UCLA L. 
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 61. See generally Mark Anner, Jennifer Bair & Jeremy Blasi, Toward Joint Liability in 
Global Supply Chains:  Addressing the Root Causes of Labor Violations in International 
Subcontracting Networks, 35 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2013); Cummings, supra note 32. 
 62. Aaron Grieser, Comment, Defining the Outer Limits of Global Compliance Programs:  
Emerging Legal & Reputational Liability in Corporate Supply Chains, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 
285, 319–20 (2008). 
 63. 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (2012). 
 64. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE:  WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY 
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 215–16, 227–28 (2014). 
 65. See, e.g., Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the 
Need for Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2193 (1994); 
Stephanie A. Koltookian, Note, Some (Don’t) Like It Hot:  The Use of the “Hot Goods” 
Injunction in Perishable Agriculture, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1841, 1847–58 (2015); see also David 
Weil, Crafting a Progressive Workplace Regulatory Policy:  Why Enforcement Matters, 28 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 125, 141–42 (2007) (advocating for more widespread use of the hot 
goods provision). 
 66. Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 1, 30 (2010). 
 67. WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #80:  THE PROHIBITION 
AGAINST SHIPMENT OF “HOT GOODS” UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2014). 
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and have other priorities.  The combined result is that public regulation has 
not been an effective substitute for private enforcement of worker rights. 
A third strategy has been to hold lead firms accountable to consumers.  In 
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky,68 a consumer sued Nike on the grounds that it misled 
buyers about the conditions under which its goods were produced.69  Nike 
claimed that its representations were protected by the First Amendment.70  
The case was settled before being adjudicated, but the California Supreme 
Court did reverse the trial court’s dismissal on the grounds that Nike was 
only entitled to the lesser First Amendment protections granted commercial 
speech.71  Lawyers are sufficiently skeptical about consumers’ legal 
arguments that this strategy has not been pursued systematically. 
Consumer movements also have sought to exert market pressure on lead 
firms, and these campaigns have been more successful in discrete cases.  
However, perhaps because labor abuses are so widespread, there has never 
been a consumer movement of a magnitude sufficient to trigger any 
substantial changes in industry practices at the ground level.  The problem is 
not really that consumers are unaware of dangerous working conditions so 
much as the sheer pervasiveness of those conditions raises the cost of 
deliberately avoiding such goods beyond the price many consumers are 
apparently willing to pay.72 
The most important changes that consumer movements have won pertain 
to the formal commitments of lead firms.  In the fourth and final strategy for 
lead firm accountability, consumer and worker advocacy groups have pushed 
lead firms to adopt codes of conduct for suppliers.73  Some codes are quasi-
contractual and are inspired by the “jobbers agreements” of the mid-twentieth 
century.74  Those contracts among workers, contractors, and lead firms fixed 
labor prices in the domestic apparel supply chain.75  The agreements were 
initially imposed by a “fair code” under the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA), but they were sustained by collective action of the International 
Ladies Garment Workers Union after the NIRA was struck down as 
 
 68. 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per curiam). 
 69. Id. at 656. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 657. 
 72. See Allison M. Snyder, Note, Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable:  Is 
Non-Financial Disclosure the Answer?, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 565, 599–606 (observing 
limitations of voluntary disclosure of corporate practices); cf. Robert Dorfman, The Economics 
of Products Liability:  A Reaction to McKean, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 92, 98 (1970) (“[T]he 
problem of products liability arises because we live in a world in which it is costly to obtain 
full, or even adequate, information about the products we use.”).  Although it is difficult to 
obtain information about the conditions under which any particular good is made, the 
ubiquitous phenomenon of dangerous working conditions is not costly to learn. 
 73. See Grieser, supra note 62, at 291–92; Sarah Rackoff, Note, Room Enough for the Do-
Gooders:  Corporate Social Accountability and the Sherman Act, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1037, 
1043–47 (2007). 
 74. See generally Anner, Bair & Blasi, supra note 61. 
 75. Id. 
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unconstitutional.76  However, these agreements fell apart when contractors 
moved to nonunion states.77  Worker advocates today recommend the 
adoption of international or global framework agreements (GFAs) between 
international union federations and multinational companies or global brands 
to achieve similar private regulation of working conditions.78 
Over 100 GFAs have been signed.79  The vast majority of GFAs are 
between a global union federation and a transnational corporation based in 
Western Europe.80  The most dominant global union in the GFA context is 
the IndustriALL Global Union, followed by UNI Global Union.81  While 
earlier GFAs did not even reference supply chains, now most include some 
reference to them, though enforcement language varies considerably.82  In 
fact, with a few exceptions, GFAs typically have few substantive terms.83  
The agreements have been successful where competing unions came together 
to pressure a corporation; ongoing union pressure has been critical, rather 
than any roadmap for enforcement contained within the GFA itself.84  Absent 
union monitoring, GFAs are poorly enforced.85 
Most corporate codes are adopted unilaterally, albeit under some pressure 
from one or more nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).  In these codes, 
the corporation undertakes to ensure that all of its suppliers abide by some 
standards without assuming any other directed obligation to do so.86  
Although companies do expend substantial resources monitoring suppliers 
under these agreements, they have not effected any industry-wide change in 
practice.87  Organizations like the Maquila Solidarity Network, a Canadian 
 
 76. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (striking 
down the NIRA). 
 77. See Anner, Bair & Blasi, supra note 61, at 20. 
 78. See Felix Hadwiger, Global Framework Agreements:  Achieving Decent Work in 
Global Supply Chains?, 7 INT’L J. LAB. RES. 75, 77 (2015). 
 79. Michael Fichter & Jamie K. McCallum, Implementing Global Framework 
Agreements:  The Limits of Social Partnership, 15 GLOBAL NETWORKS S65, S66 (2015). 
 80. Hadwiger, supra note 78, at 21. 
 81. Id. at 15. 
 82. See Jan M. Smits, Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility Codes Under Private 
Law:  On the Disciplining Power of Legal Doctrine, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 99, 111 
(2017); Haley Revak, Note, Corporate Codes of Conduct:  Binding Contract or Ideal 
Publicity?, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1645, 1657 (2012). 
 83. Hadwiger, supra note 78, at 25. 
 84. See Fichter & McCallum, supra note 79, at S66. 
 85. See id.; see also Hadwiger, supra note 78, at 6.  Note that code provisions that concern 
the employees of suppliers tend to be less committal, and therefore less binding, than 
statements about a company’s own employment practices. See generally James J. Brudney, 
Envisioning Enforcement of Freedom of Association Standards in Corporate Codes:  A 
Journey for Sinbad or Sisyphus?, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 555 (2012) (observing that 
codes of conduct are inadequately enforced at present, but offering some legal strategies for 
increasing compliance). 
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LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 591, 592 (2010) (describing the limited success of voluntary labor codes). 
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anti-sweatshop network, urge brands to follow through on their stated 
policies, but their leverage depends on fickle public attention.88  After all, 
corporations gain little for each dollar they spend monitoring their suppliers; 
they only attenuate the risk of a public relations catastrophe in the event of a 
high-profile, large-scale accident at a factory that makes their wares.  Most 
of the injuries resulting at dangerous workplaces are small-scale and do not 
pose a substantial threat to brand image.  Nevertheless, because litigation 
largely has failed as a method of ensuring accountability, most organizations 
now rely on brand protection as the impetus for socially responsible 
production.89 
The first and third strategies described above, which attempt to create 
direct liability for supplier working conditions to workers or consumers, have 
been almost entirely without success.  The second and fourth strategies, 
involving narrow regulatory initiatives or corporate codes, have achieved 
modest results but are inevitably limited in how far they can go. 
One might boil down the present legal hurdles to production liability as 
the absence of any direct relationship between a contractor’s employees and 
lead firms and the difficulty in showing that any specific wrongful action by 
a lead firm resulted in worker injury.  Suppliers sit between their employees 
and lead firms contractually.  And any responsibility by lead firms must rest 
on a theory about what they might have done rather than the identification of 
affirmative actions that they took. 
These two obstacles to liability are familiar from the path to products 
liability.  In that context, courts gradually relaxed the privity requirement 
between manufacturers and consumers and more abruptly abandoned the 
fault requirement to impose strict liability.90  As we now observe with 
production liability, the pressure on privity in the products liability context 
came first and followed consumer market developments.91  Consumers came 
to make purchasing decisions with almost exclusive attention to the 
reputation of the brand manufacturer, with little regard for the intermediate 
retailer.  In the case of production liability, consumers’ attention to brand 
manufacturers has left the original producer in the shadows.  Where the 
retailer stood between consumer and manufacturer, the supplier now stands 
between worker and manufacturer. 
Production liability, the proposed name for such liability, is obviously 
intended to invoke the inverse of products liability.  Just as products liability 
refers to the liability of a manufacturer to a consumer who may purchase 
from a third-party intermediary (distributor or retailer), production liability 
 
 88. See Anner, Bair & Blasi, supra note 61, at 35. 
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makes brands liable to employees notwithstanding a third-party intermediary 
(suppliers and employers). 
II.  THE MORAL BASIS OF PRODUCTION LIABILITY 
The central proposition of this Article, and of this Part, is that lead firms 
are morally responsible for unsafe working conditions at their suppliers, even 
though suppliers directly employ the workers.  Those who do not believe that 
moral responsibility is a necessary, if insufficient, condition for legal liability 
will be unconcerned with the proposition this Article defends.  That is, to the 
extent one believes that the question of moral responsibility for an injury only 
applies where one person is held directly legally accountable to another for 
injury—as in ordinary tort liability—production liability requires no moral 
justification.  But though private rights of action that invoke the machinery 
of private adjudication may require a distinct species of justification, we do 
not normally hold persons—including companies—liable even in regulatory 
form for actions or circumstances for which they are not responsible in any 
familiar sense.  For example, we do not assign liability for cleaning up 
environmental disasters based on liquidity or expertise—we ask who is 
responsible for the environmental damage in question.  While a system that 
did not hinge legal liability on moral responsibility might not be illegitimate, 
our practice is for liability to track responsibility, and it is a good practice.  It 
avoids arbitrariness that might arise were that practice to be abandoned.  This 
Part considers whether production liability is consistent with this practice. 
Assuming, then, that moral responsibility should be regarded a prerequisite 
for production liability, one might have two primary reservations concerning 
the conditions of moral responsibility.  First, we normally think that we have 
to make a difference to an outcome to be responsible for it.  Given the 
prevalence of poor working conditions in an industry or a foreign labor 
market, it is uncertain whether the conditions under which any given worker 
labors will be improved by the terms of a supply contract.  Altering the terms 
of supply contracts could merely divert business to another lead firm or to 
another local industry.  Thus, opponents of production liability will argue 
that lead firms make no difference to the conditions under which any 
particular person labors. 
Second, we normally think that we are not responsible for the actions of 
others.  Suppliers are moral agents that make their own choices, and it is those 
choices that translate the terms of their contracts with lead firms into poor 
working conditions for their employees.  Thus, opponents of production 
liability can argue that the link that stands between lead firms and workers 
on the supply chain (i.e., suppliers) effectively insulates lead firms from 
moral responsibility. 
This Article aims to overcome these intuitions and to show that production 
liability is morally defensible.  The aim is not to show either that legal 
liability of lead firms is morally compulsory or that lead firms are morally 
blameworthy; rather, the goal is to establish that lead firms are morally 
responsible for the dangerous working conditions under which their goods 
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are produced.  This Part proceeds first by elaborating on the relevant notion 
of responsibility, distinguishing it from culpability.  It then argues that 
contracting with suppliers generates a particular kind of responsibility for 
working conditions (i.e., complicity).  Finally, this Part argues that the type 
of complicity at issue represents a public wrong rather than a direct, private 
wrong against the particular workers who manufacture a firms’ goods under 
dangerous conditions.  The economic analysis of optimal liability is largely 
reserved for Part III, while Part IV considers specific forms of legal liability. 
A.  Outcome Responsibility 
The concept of responsibility invoked here tracks the notion of “outcome 
responsibility” developed in tort theory over the last several decades.  
Scholars such as Tony Honoré, Stephen Perry, and John Gardner have 
persuasively argued that responsibility to other private individuals is not 
properly predicated on culpability, but on a lesser form of responsibility.92  
This responsibility extends beyond the intended effects of our actions to the 
foreseeable consequences of our action or inaction—matters under our 
control.  Importantly, this account of responsibility was not engineered to 
account for lead firm responsibility in production.  It is a fundamental 
account of responsibility more generally, which means that, to the extent that 
it applies to lead firms, holding them responsible would be consistent with 
how we deploy the moral and legal concepts of responsibility more broadly. 
Foreseeability and control are not usually regarded as sufficient to generate 
blameworthiness.  That is because individuals may not intend and may 
actually disavow certain effects of their actions.  Negligent actions, for 
example, do not rise to the level of culpability where the negligent person 
never contemplates that someone may be hurt by her actions.93  Nevertheless, 
a negligent person is responsible for the injuries that flow from her 
negligence.  To hold otherwise would deny the scope of her agency; it would 
make her action and its consequences normatively indistinguishable from an 
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event in the world without agency at its root.94  For example, it would equate 
hitting someone with the car you are driving too fast to hitting someone after 
your car has been hit by the car behind you.  Failing to distinguish an event 
in which a person is merely involved from the actions she undertakes would 
undermine her very status as an agent capable of effecting change in the 
world. 
The price of one’s status as an agent capable of effecting such change is 
ownership of those effects.  Because it is central to our identity that we are 
agents who can act upon the world, it is important that we credit each other 
with responsibility for the way we move things around us, even where those 
interactions with the world outside ourselves go wrong.  If we do not accept 
responsibility for what we do, we constrict our agency.  Instead of defining 
the boundary between ourselves and the rest of the world, agency would turn 
on some inaccessible and uncertain internal boundary between fully formed 
intentions and the broader haze through which much action takes place.  A 
shared concept of outcome responsibility makes the all-important line the one 
between persons and objects outside ourselves.  Our shared reliance on the 
concept helps construct us as agents. 
However central outcome responsibility may be to individuals, the concept 
does not obviously extend to corporations.95  Certainly, we are not invested 
in constructing corporations as moral agents for the same reasons.  But, as 
with natural persons, how we treat corporations is a matter of social 
construction and not a metaphysical inquiry.96  It will turn on what we mean 
when we say that a corporation is responsible for a loss or state of affairs.  
Our legal practice largely has assumed that corporations can be morally 
responsible because they perform actions that can be attributed only to the 
corporation, as opposed to its members, and they perform those actions with 
intentions that can similarly only be attributed to the corporation itself.97  
Christian List and Philip Pettit have argued that groups like corporations may 
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qualify as moral agents because they “have representational states, 
motivational states, and a capacity to process them and act on that basis.”98 
Of course, the possibility of corporate moral responsibility remains in 
controversy, and the debate is beyond the scope of this Article.99  Another 
pragmatic, but also principled, reason for extending the basic framework of 
responsibility to corporations does not depend on assigning corporations 
“real” moral responsibility; instead, it hinges on the value of applying a 
consistent framework of legal concepts to all legal persons.  So long as 
corporations are treated as persons and subject to the same principles and 
protections of private law, the burden is on those who wish to apply a 
different standard of responsibility to corporations in a particular context.  As 
it stands, the idea of corporate responsibility would not be unique to 
production liability.  Corporations are held liable for their actions throughout 
our legal system and without controversy, at least outside criminal law.  
Indeed, it is hard to imagine a world in which they are not responsible and in 
which all fines are assigned instead to individuals within the firm.  The effect 
would be to undo the corporation as an entity, since it is designed precisely 
to shield individuals from such liability.100 
Applying the ordinary standard of responsibility—foreseeability and 
control—to lead firms, we can conclude that a retailer is responsible for the 
accidents, working conditions, or employment terms under which its goods 
are produced if those consequences of its supplier contracts are foreseeable 
and could be avoided by different contractual terms.  Neither foreseeability 
nor control is inevitable for brands, as they usually are for direct employers.  
But legal responsibility can reflect contingent facts about the global supply 
chain, the flow of information to retailers from sites of production, and the 
permitted communication between brands.  Together, these facts make it both 
predictable to brands that certain payment structures and production 
timelines worsen employment conditions at the level of production, and also 
allow lead firms control over those terms.  Notably, even supply terms that 
are economically consistent with acceptable conditions may give rise to 
responsibility for poor conditions in the absence of terms and monitoring 
systems that effectively ban those conditions, where the brand is aware that 
formally benign terms are associated with poor conditions. 
There may be still deeper grounds for responsibility in the context of 
production liability that buttress the case for giving responsibility a legal 
form.101  Although the account of bare responsibility above does not rely on 
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a theory of deliberate wrongdoing or unjust enrichment, those elements may 
point to starker responsibility for some lead firms—something approaching 
actual culpability.  Lead firms are alleged not only to be aware of dangers 
that they can prevent but to choose the contractor model precisely in order to 
avail themselves of the economic advantages of dangerous working 
conditions.102  Knowing that they cannot themselves successfully evade 
enforcement of labor standards, lead firms may choose to externalize 
production at sites that are less susceptible to regulatory oversight.  Lead 
firms thus obtain a regulatory discount without formally running afoul of any 
regulatory obligations.  Layered on the minimal conditions of responsibility 
based on foresight and control, this narrative of deliberate regulatory 
avoidance suggests lead firms are potentially not only responsible, but also 
blameworthy. 
The above argument for culpability depends on establishing intentions that 
cannot be generalized across lead firms.  At the same time, outcome 
responsibility standing alone is too generic to motivate a legal regime of 
accountability because it sweeps up so many actors without differentiating 
among them.  Consumers often know that they are purchasing goods that 
likely have been produced under wrongful conditions.103  If consumers did 
not purchase those goods, there would be marginally less demand for their 
production.  Carriers know that the goods they transport were produced under 
wrongful conditions and that the incentive to produce them would cease 
should distribution costs dramatically escalate.  Media outlets that advertise 
goods facilitate their sale—the outcome on which their production is 
predicated.  No one is proposing that all these actors be held legally liable for 
unjust working conditions. 
Indeed, it is apparent that we cannot be held legally responsible for every 
outcome for which we are responsible.  There are too many people 
responsible for any given outcome, and we have liberty and relational 
interests in being able to harm each other in many ways.  Public policy 
considerations similarly cut against attempting to hold corporations liable for 
all the harms for which they are responsible—at least when deploying a thin 
notion of responsibility, like outcome responsibility.  Sometimes there is 
disagreement about the boundaries of their appropriate legal responsibility, 
as in the case of environmental and employment losses.  For the most part, 
 
including the ideas that a lead company can cause contractor infringement, have the power to 
prevent infringement, can spread loss among many consumers, benefit from infringement, and 
assume responsibility through either representations or by virtue of citizenship to those 
working within its community. Id. at 18–32. 
 102. See Leo L. Lam, Comment, Designer Duty:  Extending Liability to Manufacturers for 
Violations of Labor Standards in Garment Industry Sweatshops, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 623, 631 
(1992) (“Avoiding responsibility for the conditions under which the garment worker labors is 
perhaps the foremost reason for the development of the contracting system.”); see also Glynn, 
supra note 29, at 209. 
 103. See generally LYN K L TJON SOEI LEN, MINIMUM CONTRACT JUSTICE:  A CAPABILITIES 
PERSPECTIVE ON SWEATSHOPS AND CONSUMER CONTRACTS (2017) (arguing that consumer 
contracts for the purchase of goods manufactured in overseas sweatshops may be 
unenforceable). 
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however, our political discourse demands more than bare outcome 
responsibility before imposing legal liability.  For example, even when 
corporations are regularly criticized for failing to promote a worthy social 
end (e.g., by failing to extend health insurance to same-sex couples before 
same-sex marriage was legally recognized), there is no suggestion that their 
policies should result in legal liability.  Production liability needs a further 
moral foothold.  It needs to be able to distinguish among the myriad social 
actors responsible for dangerous supplier working conditions and explain 
why lead firms are more responsible than other participants in global 
economic institutions. 
B.  Complicity in the Wrongs of Suppliers 
The particular form of responsibility that lead firms bear is complicity.  
Although they do not directly perpetrate any wrongs against the workers who 
manufacture their goods, their actions enable suppliers’ wrongs in such a way 
as to render lead firms complicit.  We may systematically fail to call out 
complicity because it falls in a blind spot in our moral reasoning, or what 
Christopher Kutz calls a “relational and causal solipsism.”104  We focus on 
direct individual responsibility, and it might be that our public discourse 
simply does not have the wherewithal to sustain appropriate levels of public 
censure for all types of wrongdoing.105  But “[t]he most important and far-
reaching harms and wrongs of contemporary life are the products of 
collective actions, mediated by social and institutional structures.”106  If we 
limit censure to individual production of harm, we will fail to hold anyone 
accountable for many pervasive wrongs. 
Inducing and even consenting to the production of harm by others are 
among the recognized ways in which we can be complicit in wrongdoing.107  
Knowing contribution to another’s wrongdoing is all that is required108—
complicity does not require full-fledged partnership or identification with the 
wrongdoer.  Thus, the charge of complicity against lead firms does not imply 
that lead firms are working with suppliers to subject workers to dangerous 
working conditions.  It is enough that lead firms are on notice that their 
contracts with suppliers are the occasion for which these workers are subject 
to oppressive conditions. 
Complicity amounts to a kind of infection of responsibility.  In this case, 
suppliers commit the direct wrong of employing workers dangerously, and 
their wrongdoing infects lead firms by way of their contracts for the purchase 
of goods those workers produce.  The conditions of contagion are those we 
 
 104. CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY:  ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 5 (2000). 
 105. Id. at 5–6 (suggesting individual and collective responsibility may be substitutes for 
each other due to a crowding-out effect in blaming practices). 
 106. Id. at 113. 
 107. See Gregory Mellema, Collective Responsibility and Qualifying Actions, 30 MIDWEST 
STUD. PHIL. 168, 170–72 (2006) (identifying six varieties of complicity); see also KUTZ, supra 
note 104, at 122, 138. 
 108. CHIARA LEPORA & ROBERT E. GOODIN, ON COMPLICITY AND COMPROMISE 7, 80–83 
(2013). 
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associate with shared, rather than joint, intention.  Michael Bratman 
describes shared intentions as ones that separate persons have and act in 
accordance with.  Their actions do not have to be identical but should be 
responsive to “meshing subplans.”109  Margaret Gilbert, by contrast, has a 
“plural subject account” in which members of a group are “jointly committed 
to intending as a body to do A.”110  Similarly, J. David Velleman argues that 
a unified moral subject is necessary to establish collective responsibility and 
that such a plural subject involves “two or more subjects who combine in 
such a way as to constitute one subject.”111  Bratman’s thinner account of 
cooperation captures the moral relationship between suppliers and lead firms 
better than a plural-subject account.  Lead firms do not join with suppliers in 
a common enterprise of production.  They remain arm’s-length actors, 
pursuing separate and, to some extent, rival economic interests.  However, 
their separate plans intersect in their supply contracts, which reflect a 
common interest in inattention to workers’ interests. 
The most problematic supply contracts do not directly address working 
conditions at all.  This might appear to foreclose application of Bratman’s 
account of shared intentions, if the contracts’ silence on working conditions 
is read as the absence of any objective intent with respect to working 
conditions.  We might point to evidence that lead firms specifically intend 
working conditions to be so poor in order to enable the lowest consumer 
prices.  But evidence of specific intention is uneven and, therefore, a poor 
basis for a general principle of liability, in the same way that we rejected ad 
hoc cases of culpability among lead firms as inadequate grounding for 
production liability. 
We can look instead to Larry May’s alternative account of group 
intentions, which provides a useful supplement to Bratman’s model.  May 
suggests that “pre-reflective” group intentions are ones that “are not yet 
reflected upon by each of the members of . . . [the] group.”112  They are not 
the product of individual consciousness, but “arise out of the relations and 
structures of the group.”113  In this context, we might say that lead firms and 
suppliers share a pre-reflective intent to subject workers to dangerous 
conditions even absent any specific intention to do so; their intent with 
respect to workers follows from the economic structure in which they jointly 
participate. 
At least some of the discomfort with lead firms’ conduct probably does lie 
not in their specific contracting policies, but in their role in an unjust global 
economic order or their participation in unjust local labor markets.  These 
economic structures implicate others as well.  But complicity is a matter of 
 
 109. MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION:  SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND 
AGENCY 121 (1999). 
 110. MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 22 (2000). 
 111. J. David Velleman, How to Share an Intention, 57 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 
29, 30 (1997). 
 112. LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS 62 (1987). 
 113. Id. at 61–65. 
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degree.114  Even if the supply chain were to be regarded as a group, members 
do not share equal fault because they contribute differently to the harm at 
issue.115  In fact, we might attempt to set up a sliding scale of complicity 
from copartners to noncausal participation or unknowing contribution.116  On 
such a scale, lead firms would rank well below suppliers but still well ahead 
of ordinary consumers. 
Other participants in the supply chain, including consumers, may be 
morally tainted by wrongs of suppliers because moral taint may attach to 
membership in even a thinly constituted group that commits a wrong.117  But 
even absent any affirmative intent with respect to suppliers’ workers, lead 
firms take affirmative steps that are causally linked to the workers’ harm.  
Most important, they set the timetable for production and the prices paid for 
the goods.118  Consumers do not have direct influence over these driving 
factors.  Consumers also have less knowledge of the conditions of 
production; in most cases, they do not know where production takes place or 
which supplier firm is involved.  Their relative ignorance is accompanied by 
relative uncertainty as to whether their decision to buy will actually result in 
worse conditions for any worker or group of workers.  Although all 
participants in the supply chain may share pre-reflexive intentions with 
respect to its functioning, and although the result may be that we are all thinly 
responsible for wrongful conditions of production, some agents of our 
collective economy are more obligated than others to alleviate harm as a 
result of their position in the causal chain.119 
The phenomenology of agency gives priority to near, direct, and 
unmediated effects.  When “an outcome is the joint result of the actions of a 
number of people, including ourselves, we tend to see our own agency as 
implicated to a much lesser extent than we do when we take an effect to have 
resulted solely from our own actions.”120  Complicity, like responsibility, is 
not exclusive to lead firms.  But by identifying the particular kind of 
responsibility that lead firms bear, we can see how their responsibility is more 
severe than the responsibility of other actors that might also be infected with 
responsibility for suppliers’ wrongdoing. 
 
 114. See LEPORA & GOODIN, supra note 108, at 80–83. 
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 116. LEPORA & GOODIN, supra note 108, at 8, 97–129. 
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GOODIN, supra note 108, at 63. 
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C.  Complicity as Public Wrongdoing 
Thus far, I have argued that lead firms are “outcome responsible” for 
dangerous working conditions.  More specifically, they are complicit in the 
wrongdoing of suppliers.  Just as complicity is one among many variants of 
responsibility, complicity itself is of varied character.  This Part argues that 
the complicity of lead firms amounts to public wrongdoing, and so their 
responsibility is of a public sort.  The public character of their complicity has 
two main features:  (1) it is a failure of social responsibility rather than direct 
responsibility to particular private persons, and (2) it is more forward-looking 
than backward-looking, in that it justifies a special role in rectifying unjust 
social conditions rather than in compensating losses that have already been 
incurred. 
Absent specific circumstances that we cannot generalize across the 
industry—that is, direct control over production methods or compensation—
lead firms are not directly responsible to the employees of suppliers.  They 
are responsible for the conditions under which those employees work, in the 
sense of outcome responsibility, and they are complicit in the wrong to which 
those working conditions amount.  Although there is a high degree of 
certainty that low prices and tight schedules will result in poor working 
conditions, there is also a high degree of uncertainty that any particular 
person will be wronged by working under those conditions.  This is not just 
because the employees of suppliers are usually unknown to lead firms and 
turnover in the workforce is high; the very number of employees that a 
supplier hires depends on the existence and terms of the supply contract as 
well.  More exacting terms in supply contracts that demand safe working 
conditions are likely to result in lower levels of employment and probably 
lower pay.  It is quite likely that many individual workers, given their 
oppressive choice set, prefer unsafe working conditions to safe working 
conditions, where the latter are bundled with a higher risk of unemployment 
and lower pay.  It is therefore not clear that a supply contract that creates an 
unsafe job is a wrong to the particular worker who occupies that position.  
The duty to produce goods under safe working conditions is not best 
conceived as a duty to particular workers, but as a duty to support just social 
institutions.121  Even though individual workers may prefer unsafe working 
conditions, it is a collective aim to abolish dangerous working conditions 
because we think it will benefit the worst-off workers in the long run.  The 
duty to further that aim effectively runs to society as a whole rather than to 
particular workers.  Lead firms do not wrong individual workers, but their 
supply contracts render them complicit in the subversion of just employment 
practices.122 
 
 121. The natural duty to support just institutions is associated with the political theory of 
John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 114–16 (1971). 
 122. Remedial responsibilities can flow from “the interests we all share in sustaining the 
major social institutions.” Derrick Darby & Nyla R. Branscombe, Beyond the Sins of the 
Fathers:  Responsibility for Inequality, 38 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 121, 133 (2014). 
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The second respect in which we should regard the complicity of lead firms 
as a matter of public responsibility follows from the first.  The duty to support 
just social institutions is a mostly forward-looking duty.123  On particular 
facts, we can show that some actions violate such a duty even absent a related 
legal obligation.  But most of the time we invoke the duty to support just 
social institutions as a justification for imposing more specific legal duties 
on private actors.  Although private actors may already have responsibility 
for a set of outcomes (as lead firms bear responsibility for the conditions 
under which their goods are produced), they do not have a specific duty to 
avoid those outcomes until it is recognized publicly.  We could say that, as 
yet, the duty of lead firms to contract with suppliers on terms that rule out 
dangerous work is subject only to an inchoate public duty to avoid creating 
dangerous working conditions.  We are still waiting for clear public 
recognition of such a duty.  Any conclusion that lead firms are complicit in 
wrongful employment practices, then, does not by itself generate a legal duty 
or legal entitlement.  Rather, it justifies the imposition of such legal liability.  
And because the underlying responsibility is public, the appropriate form that 
liability should take is regulatory.124  Although the merits of different forms 
of production liability will be considered at greater length in Part IV, the 
moral analysis here points toward public liability as the default form for 
recognizing complicity in the manner of a public wrong. 
It is not enough to justify production liability to show that corporations are 
morally responsible for the poor working conditions of their suppliers or even 
that they are more complicit than other participants in surrounding economic 
institutions.  Given the material consequences of production liability, any 
affirmative argument for recognizing it has to consider its expected economic 
impact. 
In the next Part, this Article argues that not only is the moral predicate of 
legal responsibility fulfilled, such liability is also commendable on 
instrumental grounds.  Once we overcome intuitions about the boundaries of 
responsibility, as we did in the context of manufacturer responsibility for 
consumer injuries, we can adapt legal liability to effectively respond to 
contemporary production and distribution systems in much the way that 
products liability did. 
 
 123. Political responsibility is more forward-looking than a liability model of 
responsibility. See Iris Marion Young, Responsibility and Global Labor Justice, in 
RESPONSIBILITY IN CONTEXT:  PERSPECTIVES 53, 65–66 (Gorana Ognjenovic ed., 2010).  
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inaction generates typical political responsibility. See generally id. 
 124. Cf. KUTZ, supra note 104, at 138 (tying the appropriate form of accountability to an 
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III.  OPTIMAL COST ASSIGNMENT 
The question of whether production liability is efficient may be still more 
difficult than its parallel in products liability.  In the case of product defects 
that injure consumers, it is clear that consumers are within the set of subjects 
whose welfare the state aims to improve.125  Moreover, consumer interests 
are, to a substantial extent, internalized by firms that wish to keep and win 
customers.126  By contrast, most of the workers at lead firms’ suppliers are 
located overseas.  Arguably, their welfare losses do not have the same 
standing in social welfare calculations that underlie U.S. policy.  That 
problem makes the questions around “fair” compensation especially difficult.  
However, one of the motivations behind restricting the question considered 
here to workplace safety is that we can presume that there is a minimum 
threshold level of workplace safety below which it is impermissible to allow 
work to take place—irrespective of the local labor market, other contract 
terms, knowing consent by workers, developmental stage of the economy, 
and local law.  This is a level of danger that no one would be prepared to 
accept under fair background conditions or, at least, one at which no U.S. 
national is permitted to conduct business, even outside the United States.  
Obviously, determining exactly what the workplace standards should be in 
this context is difficult and mired in the details of specific industries.  Even 
if international law supplies the norm that certain working conditions are 
intolerable, it does not supply the minimum standard that the United States 
should deploy in regulating the conditions under which goods sold here must 
be produced.  The standard imposed by the United States with respect to 
overseas work sites should avoid violating the right of local communities to 
decide their own local standards.  A sufficiently minimum standard would 
probably overlap substantially with local standards on the books (even if they 
are poorly enforced) and might be negotiated by way of trade agreements so 
that host governments can participate in setting the standard.  But, ultimately, 
the standard in question is the standard below which we cannot abide our 
national corporations conducting business.  Politics must supply that 
standard. 
The challenge here is different.  We must identify the form of the liability 
regime that would best raise workplace safety to such a minimum bar, 
whatever that might be.  Where dangerous working conditions are below the 
fixed threshold, not only the injuries that materialize but also the (moral and 
psychological) situation of working in such a hazardous environment can be 
regarded as an externality of the garment enterprise.  The policy aim should 
 
 125. In fact, the dominant norm in the contracts literature is consumer sovereignty, or that 
consumer preferences on risk allocation should prevail. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Proposals 
for Products Liability Reform:  A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 355 (1988).  There 
is no parallel norm of worker sovereignty in the context of production. 
 126. Cf. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1490 (2010) (“There is a crucial difference between situations in 
which strangers are harmed and those in which customers are harmed . . . if its customers are 
injured, it would expect to suffer . . . losses . . . .  [M]arket forces will not induce firms to 
increase safety if those at risk are strangers.”). 
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be to deter such dangerous working conditions absolutely, though 
realistically some factories are likely to operate below the minimum 
threshold at any given time.  We might simultaneously and separately 
undertake to reduce the rate of workplace injury more generally in a similar 
way to how we aim to reduce the rate of consumer injury.  The problem of 
pricing those injuries across disparate markets, however, is comparable to the 
problems associated with determining “fair” wages. 
There are several actors in a position to prevent dangerous working 
conditions at any given factory:  the workers, the supplier-contractors, and 
the lead firms with substantial bargaining power vis-à-vis supplier-
contractors.  In principle, the state could impose costs, such as fines, on any 
of these actors when they are implicated in unsafe working conditions. 
Outside of forced-labor situations, workers have some control over the 
phenomenon of dangerous work.  They could, in principle, decline to accept 
egregious working conditions.  After all, what counts as egregious is set in 
large part by reference to what we think a worker would refuse.  
Unfortunately, the standard is not set by reference to what workers will 
actually accept but what we speculate that they would knowingly and freely 
accept under fair background conditions, and those qualifications are 
necessary precisely because the circumstances under which many workers 
choose to accept employment at dangerous workplaces do not meet those 
stipulations.  In some cases, workers are unaware of the dangerous nature of 
their workplace because safety deficiencies are not apparent.  For example, 
they may be unaware of structural or electrical problems in the building, or 
they may be ignorant to the risks created by poorly maintained and outdated 
manufacturing equipment.  One of the most common workplace hazards is 
occupational asthma, a condition that may worsen over time as workers are 
exposed to invisible dust, vapors, gases, or fumes in their workplaces.127 
In other cases, workers may become aware of the dangerous nature of their 
working conditions only upon commencing employment, after they have 
already fallen into a cycle of dependence on (or debt to) a particular employer 
that makes exit especially costly.  Finally, many workers have such a poor 
choice set to begin with that working under dangerous conditions is not their 
worst option.  In these cases, restricting their employment options will leave 
them worse off in the near term (from at least one conception of welfare) 
since they are prepared to accept terms that are no longer available to them. 
Because this last set of cases probably describes many workers, we cannot 
properly characterize regulation of dangerous working conditions as the 
enforcement of free-standing individual entitlements.  Rather, any individual 
entitlement to workplace safety is best regarded as derivative from a social 
interest in imposing general standards.  The social interest might ultimately 
operate to the benefit of most workers, but its pursuit will almost certainly 
come at the expense of some subgroup of workers.  Whether by virtue of 
collective action problems or actual self-interest, we cannot expect workers 
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to simply refrain from accepting working conditions that a national political 
community, to which they may or may not belong, might find unacceptable.  
To enforce a rule against dangerous working conditions by attempting to alter 
worker behavior, we would have to either directly fine workers or otherwise 
penalize them, for example, by refusing to enforce the payment of 
compensation they are due or by rendering them ineligible for future work.  
Since workplace regulations are at least nominally intended to improve the 
situation of workers, it would be ironic in the least to penalize workers in any 
direct way.  Moreover, most available (and wholly unattractive) means 
require cooperation by the direct employer:  the supplier.  For the reasons to 
be discussed, we cannot expect their cooperation. 
The next and most obvious set of actors that could be targeted by a legal 
regime are the supplier-contractors themselves.  Recall that many suppliers 
are overseas, so, barring a violation of the laws of nations, they are outside 
the reach of U.S. law, whether via a private right of action or an agency 
directive.128  Contractors in the United States are usually judgment-proof, 
and bankruptcy protects them from any prolonged debt burden.129  When 
they do pay out fines, the additional cost pressures result in further reduction 
of employee compensation.130  But contractors do not usually pay.  They are 
highly mobile with limited capital and therefore easily evade enforcement 
authorities, for example, by closing and reopening under new names.131  The 
result is that neither domestic nor overseas suppliers are a viable point of 
enforcement because fines and civil judgments cannot be collected.  This 
conclusion is unsurprising:  the fact that the present system of labor 
enforcement depends entirely on managing the behavior of suppliers is the 
reason that the present regime is wholly unsatisfactory to most observers. 
Lead firms are an alternative, and, indeed, they can efficiently prevent 
dangerous working conditions at suppliers.  First, lead firms are in the best 
position to actually take steps that would improve workplace safety because 
they have an overview of industry practice and available technology.  They 
bear relatively low information costs in coming up with specific steps that 
each supplier must take.  Some of the relevant information will be local to 
specific factory sites.  But because lead firms have the most resources of any 
actor in the supply chain, they may be in a better position to acquire even 
local information than the supplier.  This advantage to assigning 
responsibility to lead firms somewhat mimics the argument, in the context of 
products liability, that manufacturers are in the best position to prevent injury 
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because they are the ones in a position to identify measures that can be taken 
to improve design or reduce the error rate in manufacturing.132 
Additional arguments for the assignment of costs to lead firms apply in the 
context of production liability.  Many observers suggest that lead firms 
presently limit the possibility of decent working conditions by virtue of the 
low prices they pay suppliers.133  Lead firms set the prices that they pay 
suppliers by calculating how long it will take to produce garments under ideal 
conditions; but those conditions do not approximate the conditions under 
which the goods are actually produced by their undercapitalized suppliers, 
who tend to employ low-skilled workers and use inferior machinery.134  The 
result is that the prices that lead firms pay are barely enough to cover supplier 
costs, even where supplier costs are artificially depressed by noncompliance 
with labor codes.  Were suppliers to provide safe workplaces, their contracts 
with lead firms would be losing contracts.  Thus, lead firms are at least in a 
position to make it possible to improve workplace safety by paying higher 
prices.  Firms that do not wish to undertake reform of their suppliers’ 
practices can search out suppliers that already comply with minimum 
workplace-safety standards. 
Lead firms could also trade off a price increase for goods in exchange for 
increased control over suppliers’ workplaces, as well as increased monitoring 
rights.  They could do so in a way that leaves unaltered the suppliers’ 
expected gains from trade, entirely at their own expense.  Of course, they are 
unlikely to simply absorb either the costs of actually improving workplace 
conditions or paying off regulatory fines upon failure.  In part, we can expect 
them to attempt to recoup costs through indemnification clauses with 
suppliers135 and possibly through the purchase of insurance.  But we can also 
expect lead firms to pass on their increased costs to consumers. 
The fact that lead firms are in a position to pass increased costs associated 
with improved working conditions on to consumers is actually one of the 
strongest arguments in favor of assigning costs to them.136  After all, there 
may be intermediaries between lead firms and suppliers who can also be 
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described as complicit but who cannot raise retail prices.  One aim of a 
regime of production liability should be to shift costs to the parties best 
positioned to distribute costs widely instead of allowing them to fall 
arbitrarily and in concentrated form on unwitting workers—just as products 
liability shifts costs from a handful of unwitting consumers to 
manufacturers.137  Perhaps even more clearly than in the context of products 
liability, lead firms are, by virtue of their market position, in the best position 
to reflect the price of workplace safety in the price of goods such that all users 
of the goods bear their true costs.138 
The other means by which states sometimes aim to impose costs on 
consumers are undesirable and unworkable.  The state criminalizes the 
possession of some goods, but crimination would exaggerate the 
responsibility of consumers in this case and would involve heavy-handed 
state machinery that has proven costly and ineffective in smaller markets.  
The state could also subject a disfavored product to a special consumer tax 
but, by imposing costs on all goods irrespective of the conditions under which 
they were produced, such a tax would fail to capture (or track) responsibility 
altogether.  It would be impracticable for the state to identify goods produced 
under noncompliant conditions and subject only those goods to a tax at the 
point of sale.  The most feasible way to make consumers pay for humane 
working conditions is to impose liability on lead firms in the first instance. 
Finally, lead firms are the cheapest point of legal enforcement.  
Reputational interests would reinforce the deterrent effect of any legal rule.  
Because lead firms are the fewest in number and have long corporate lives 
and substantial assets, the ordinary mechanisms for enforcing legal 
judgments will be effective.  Perhaps equally important, lead firms interact 
with the legal system at many points and cannot afford to operate in its 
shadows.  They can be expected to undertake compliance with any legal rule 
to which they are subject. 
If the previous Part established that production liability is morally 
defensible, this Part intended to establish that it is economically 
commendable.  But, of course, whether production liability would have 
perverse effects on the incentives of retailers, suppliers, export countries, or 
even foreign employees will depend on the particular legal form it takes, 
which leads to the issues addressed in the next Part, namely, the mechanism 
of enforcement and the standard of liability. 
 
 137. Products liability history was driven in early part by ideas of internalization and risk 
distribution. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability:  A Critical History of the 
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 483 (1985). 
 138. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE 
L.J. 499, 505 (1961) (“[Resource-allocation] theory requires that among the several parties 
engaged in an enterprise the loss should be placed on the party which is most likely to cause 
the burden to be reflected in the price of whatever the enterprise sells.”). 
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IV.  AGENCY ENFORCEMENT 
This Part considers several legal mechanisms by which production liability 
might be implemented.  We could recognize a right of action in various 
stakeholders, either under existing common-law doctrines or by way of a new 
statute.  We could further promote transnational private regulation or 
facilitate agreements among retailers to abide by voluntary standards (which 
would be mandatory for their suppliers).  Or we could impose new statutory 
duties for corporations.  Although politically difficult to attain, this Article 
argues that on-point legislation paired with even a limited administrative 
remedy is the best and, perhaps, the necessary route to production liability.  
While we can expect public underenforcement of any statutory provision, 
such a course could give rise to two additional indirect enforcement 
mechanisms.  First, shareholders of corporations that knowingly violate 
statutory obligations can bring derivative suits.  Second, suppliers can seek 
to avoid terms in supply agreements where those agreements effectuate a 
violation of the statute.  Before considering the advantages of an affirmative 
statutory approach, this Part addresses the deficiencies in each of the 
alternative methods of enacting production liability. 
A.  Private Rights of Action by Employees 
The most obvious way to recognize production liability, and the form most 
parallel to products liability, would be to make retailers liable to individual 
employees whose working conditions fail to meet a given standard.  One 
might attempt to achieve this by reforming or expanding existing doctrines 
such as joint employer liability, vicarious liability, or the doctrine of 
nondelegable duties; or courts could adopt a more sweeping new theory of 
private liability along the lines of products liability.  Although there is much 
to be said for direct liability to workers, there are good reasons not to go this 
route. 
First, private recourse directly against lead firms will distort labor markets.  
Employees will prefer to work for factories producing goods for recognizable 
brands.  Although lesser-known lead firms will face the same costs, they 
likely will face higher costs as the labor costs of branded firms fall in 
response to higher worker demands for those workplaces, which will be 
perceived to provide more credible assurances. 
Second, relying on private claims will distort the kinds of safety measures 
in which lead firms invest.  Individuals are most likely to sue for immediate, 
substantial injuries.  But many of the most important workplace-safety 
regulations are intended to promote worker safety in ways that do not 
decrease actionable claims.  For example, general improvements in the 
hygiene or ventilation of a workplace may not prevent specific accidents, but 
such improvements produce marginally superior health outcomes for all 
workers.  Using safer chemicals may decrease cancer rates.  But workers are 
unlikely to successfully sue for general lack of hygiene, poor ventilation, or 
the use of carcinogens in a workplace because it is difficult to prove causation 
of specific injuries and because many illnesses are too minor to justify 
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litigation.  Such conditions may go unaddressed because companies will 
primarily invest in preventing injuries that are likely to result in private suits 
while neglecting to protect against minor but pervasive health risks. 
Finally, given existing legal frameworks, any direct right of action is likely 
to be far more accessible to domestic workers than overseas workers.  The 
effect will exacerbate the price differential between domestic and overseas 
labor to the long-term detriment of the domestic garment industry.  The 
overall welfare of garment workers will not be improved.  Of course, the 
weight to be assigned to this consideration depends on the precise normative 
theory that underpins our commitment to safe workplaces. 
B.  Private Rights of Action by Consumers 
Lead firms may become indirectly liable for supplier working conditions 
where consumers are entitled to sue for fraud or misrepresentation.139  This 
requires an initial representation by lead firms that their goods are produced 
under acceptable conditions.  Many companies already feel pressure to issue 
such statements.140  If courts recognized those representations as material 
and consumers are presumed to rely on them, companies could face 
substantial liability to consumers as a class.  A statutory regime might bolster 
common-law claims either by requiring certification for the representation or 
creating a presumption of materiality and reliance.  A quite different tack 
could enable consumers to successfully claim against lead firms for supplier 
working conditions under a theory that extends public nuisance law; lead 
firms would be alleged to be responsible for creating impermissible 
conditions.  Such a theory would require some legislative action to establish 
that the conditions created by lead firms are properly characterized as 
illegal.141 
Separate from the practical obstacles, there is something peculiar, in 
principle, about improving overseas working conditions by creating a private 
right of action for domestic consumers.  Although this Article concludes that 
direct responsibility to suppliers’ workers is ill-conceived, such liability at 
least correctly identifies as potential plaintiffs that group whose welfare is at 
issue.  Consumer practices suggest that most consumers do not in fact regard 
the conditions under which goods are produced as highly material to their 
individual consumption choices.  There is no good way for courts to 
distinguish between those consumers who do care and those who do not.  
Moreover, since even concerned consumers do not suffer material harm, they 
normally will be entitled only to rescission.  Any further damages would be 
a windfall for just that privileged group whose interest in low prices competes 
with workers’ interest in decent working conditions. 
 
 139. As discussed in Part I, some observers argue that there is an existing basis for such 
liability. See supra Part I. 
 140. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 34, at 836. 
 141. See generally Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (rejecting the 
plaintiff states’ attempt to hold corporations responsible for global warming). 
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C.  Private Regulation 
Perhaps the easiest way to recognize production liability is through 
voluntary agreements among brands.  Firms within an industry sometimes 
agree to abide by set standards and assume responsibility for contracting with 
suppliers on terms that ensure compliance.  Some company alliances work 
with nongovernmental or international organizations to help enforce 
voluntary agreements.  Others adopt no enforcement plan. 
Were these agreements to be fostered and then enforced, it would be the 
most politically feasible means to establish liability.  Because all signatories 
would have an interest in enforcement against other signatories, and because 
the effect that improving supplier working conditions would have on market 
share is minimal with coordinated action, lead firms actually have an interest 
in cooperating in the adoption of industry standards. 
But voluntary agreement among lead firms is the wrong mechanism by 
which to set their obligations to third parties.  Contract as an institution is 
designed to maximize the joint interests of parties to an agreement.  There is 
no obligation or incentive to give any weight to third parties.  Firms may 
agree to abide by voluntary standards because they perceive the threat of 
regulation or otherwise see market constraints from the consumer side.  
However, there is little reason to expect that firms will give the interests of 
an economically weak group due weight given the ineffectiveness of 
regulatory threats over time and mass consumer indifference.142  Nor can we 
have confidence that the groups that would attempt to secure and negotiate 
private regulatory agreements would appropriately represent the range of 
interests at stake; most obviously, we can expect the interests of domestic 
and international workers to diverge.  The private regulations that firms come 
up with unilaterally or agree to under pressure may be better than nothing 
and can be encouraged as an intermediate step toward regulation.  Alongside 
public regulation, private contract can be the basis for the kind of monitoring, 
feedback, and advocacy that must feed into any administrative enforcement 
scheme.  But serious self-enforcement standing alone is a costly proposition 
that companies will not embrace any more than necessary.143  Indeed, self-
enforcement to date is only occasionally effective and is, more often, plagued 
by incomplete or inaccurate reporting.144  Companies have been prepared to 
“partner” with industry watch groups but have not taken obvious steps to 
 
 142. See Debra Cohen Maryanov, Sweatshop Liability:  Corporate Codes of Conduct and 
the Governance of Labor Standards in the International Supply Chain, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 397, 403 (2010) (stating that codes of conduct are intended to ward off more restrictive 
regulation).  The enforcement of codes is limited. Id. at 409. 
 143. For example, Gap spent $10,000 annually on inspections at a single plant in El 
Salvador and estimated it would cost 4.5 percent of its annual total profits of $877 million in 
2000 to replicate this model throughout its supply chain. Grieser, supra note 62, at 312. 
 144. Auditors’ connections to the firms they audit make observers skeptical of their 
reporting. See Paul David Harpur, New Governance and the Role of Public and Private 
Monitoring of Labor Conditions:  Sweatshops and China Social Compliance for Textile and 
Apparel Industry, 38 RUTGERS L. REC. 49, 58 (2011). 
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redress poor working conditions, such as making specific conditions 
regarding worker compensation or altering the way they pay suppliers.145 
In a few notable cases, worker groups backed by considerable external 
expertise and resources have managed to implement rigorous compliance 
programs that have radically improved working conditions in industries that 
were previously plagued with the worst abuses.146  But we can have no 
reasonable expectation that the resources that these movements have required 
will materialize in every industry or supply chain in which regulation would 
be appropriate. 
Besides the direct costs of subjecting itself to a strict enforcement 
regime—the costs of both monitoring and compliance—a company 
contemplating participation in an “industry-wide” effort faces the probability 
that at least some firms will choose not to participate.  Among the most high-
profile industry accords has been the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in 
Bangladesh, adopted in the aftermath of a factory collapse in Bangladesh that 
killed more than 1000 workers.147  Although most worker deaths related to 
workplace safety are more difficult to trace causally and not en masse, the 
stark horror of the 2013 factory collapse prompted particular outrage.  NGOs 
pushed for action and the resulting Accord’s inspection standards drew from 
the Bangladesh National Building Code,148 but they were modified based on 
multiparty discussions facilitated by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO).  Nevertheless, even in this salient case, numerous brands linked to the 
factory, including J. C. Penney, Wal-Mart, H&M, and The Children’s Place, 
did not sign the accord.149  Only twelve U.S. companies have signed thus 
far.150  The organization that monitored most North American firms, the 
Alliance for Bangladesh Workplace Safety, has completed its five-year 
term.151 
 
 145. See Dana Raigrodski, Creative Capitalism and Human Trafficking:  A Business 
Approach to Eliminate Forced Labor and Human Trafficking from Global Supply Chains, 
8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 71, 128–30 (2016). 
 146. See generally James J. Brudney, Decent Labour Standards in Corporate Supply 
Chains:  The Immokalee Workers Model, in TEMPORARY LABOUR MIGRATION IN THE GLOBAL 
ERA:  THE REGULATORY CHALLENGES 351 (Joanna Howe & Rosemary Owens eds., 2016). 
 147. See ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING SAFETY BANGL., http://bangladeshaccord.org 
[https://perma.cc/TH8M-WUXX] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 148. Clare O’Connor, These Retailers Involved in Bangladesh Factory Disaster Have Yet 
to Compensate Victims, FORBES (Apr. 26, 2014, 5:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
clareoconnor/2014/04/26/these-retailers-involved-in-bangladesh-factory-disaster-have-yet-
to-compensate-victims/ [https://perma.cc/6HV3-W9FE]. 
 149. Id.; Rhonda Smith, Bangladeshi Labor Leader Stresses Concerns on Safety at Wal-
Mart Shareholders’ Meeting, 27 Lab. Relations Wk. (BNA) 24 (June 12, 2013). 
 150. See Accord Signatories, ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING SAFETY BANGL., 
https://bangladeshaccord.org/signatories [https://perma.cc/DHS7-4QVK] (last visited Apr. 
10, 2019). 
 151. ALLIANCE FOR BANGL. WORKER SAFETY, http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/K4WQ-VGTJ] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
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Self-regulation does not represent a stable solution to an international 
regulatory problem in the absence of some new, distinct incentive for firms 
to take into account the interests of those outside their industry group.152 
D.  Administrative Enforcement:  Regulatory Strict Liability 
A simple public regulatory requirement that imposes an affirmative duty 
on companies to use suppliers with safe working conditions best embodies 
production liability.  Responsibility for the conditions of production at a 
supplier is of a public nature:  supply terms that motivate or perpetuate poor 
working conditions are a problem from a systemic point of view.  Dangerous 
working conditions do not represent a wrong to any single class, but are part 
of a market dynamic that needs to be disrupted as a matter of public justice.  
Just as corporations are required to engage in or forbear a variety of activities 
that are against the public interest, they should be required to contract for 
goods on terms that are compatible with a just market for consumer goods.  
A statute that codifies production liability would have familial precedent in 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, which similarly held corporations 
liable for activities that are in substantial part overseas.153 
Assuming only civil liability is at stake, some administrative branch or 
agency should be assigned the right to hold corporations accountable by 
imposing fines for violations of the substantive conduct requirements.  The 
fines should not be conceived as compensatory; their level should take into 
account the rate of enforcement.  Based on our experience with other labor-
related enforcement, we can expect that limited resources will be allocated 
to enforcement of any new provision.  Nevertheless, a substantive 
requirement would be useful both for the direct deterrence achieved by 
substantial fines and because a statutory duty would allow supplementary 
means of enforcement that do not require government action.154  A complete 
solution will involve joint use of public regulation and private litigation.155 
1.  Derivative Actions by Shareholders 
Shareholders can bring derivative suits on behalf of corporations against 
directors for failure to exercise oversight where the directors knew, or should 
 
 152. Cf. Mark T. Kawakami, Pitfalls of Over-Legalization:  When the Law Crowds Out 
and Spills Over, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 147, 151–56 (2017) (arguing that affording 
legal status to voluntary codes will undermine intrinsic corporate motivation to abide by social 
norms); Raigrodski, supra note 145, at 111 (arguing that it may be in the business interests of 
lead firms to eliminate at least some of suppliers’ most egregious conduct). 
 153. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-2 (2012). 
 154. The proposal here is an inverse of what John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky 
describe in The Easy Case for Products Liability Law:  A Response to Professors Polinsky 
and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919 (2010).  They observe, in the context of products 
liability, that markets and regulatory forces would not work in the same way without a tort 
liability system “feeding” them.  This Article proposes a regulatory system that can feed an 
ancillary system of private enforcement. 
 155. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 
357, 365 (1984). 
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have known, of violations of law.156  Such derivative suits usually fail 
because they require that plaintiffs plead demand futility with some 
precision; that is, they require that plaintiffs show the company’s board of 
directors is conflicted out of the decision whether to sue.157  Plaintiffs often 
try to show that directors were on notice of violations of law and chose not 
to take action.158 
Although plaintiffs rarely show demand futility, even in cases that likely 
would not have survived dismissal, corporations often pay out substantial 
settlements on their directors’ behalf.  As long as settlement values bear some 
relation to the probability of the suit succeeding on its merits, it helps offset 
lackluster public enforcement.  In the case of production liability, we can 
expect demand futility claims to fare somewhat better than in typical 
derivative suits because NGOs may systematically bring attention to poor 
working conditions, and there may be a higher public relations cost to being 
publicly associated with poor working conditions than more abstract 
financial regulatory requirements.  While most corporate misconduct may be 
secret (outside of the corporations’ own employees), the working conditions 
at firms’ suppliers are not.  Because it will be easier to make directors aware, 
and to subsequently document their awareness, plaintiffs may have more 
success with derivative suits related to production liability than in other types 
of derivative suits. 
The major drawback of this mechanism of enforcement is that it is largely 
under the control of a single state, Delaware.  And there is little reason to 
expect that Delaware courts will be eager to play a role in enforcing 
production liability.  Nevertheless, on the margin, the prospect of derivative 
suits will increase the cost of noncompliance with a regulatory rule. 
2.  Unenforceability of Supply Agreements 
A statutory obligation to contract with suppliers on terms that assure 
tolerable working conditions for suppliers’ employees could also justify 
nonenforcement of noncompliant supply agreements, or at least it might 
render unenforceable those terms associated with poor working conditions 
(such as time schedules) on the grounds that such agreements are against 
public policy.  Although it would be ironic for suppliers to benefit from a 
lead firm’s failure to effectively reign in supplier practices, the doctrine that 
 
 156. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (“A failure 
to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a 
purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary 
acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails 
to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.”); 
see also Thomas A. Uebler, Shareholder Police Power:  Shareholders’ Ability to Hold 
Directors Accountable for Intentional Violations of Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 204–13 
(2008). 
 157. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254–55 (Del. 2000) (holding that a plaintiff must 
allege with particularity facts sufficient to establish demand futility). 
 158. These are so-called Caremark claims. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 
698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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allows nonenforcement of agreements against public policy allows such 
inequity in the interest of vindicating the implicated legal rule.  While 
suppliers cannot be expected to systematically invoke the right to void supply 
agreements on these grounds, the availability of this measure should help 
discipline lead firms on the margin. 
E.  Liability Standard 
No duty-imposing statute can establish a detailed worldwide minimum 
standard of workplace safety.  One possibility would be to incorporate local 
rules and regulations on workplace safety that are already in place.  That 
might make sense for working conditions at domestic suppliers. 
Arguably, however, the duty on lead firms can be less rigorous than that 
which applies directly to employers.  That is, we might require employers to 
maintain safety standards at a higher level than we require lead firms to 
maintain at those same suppliers.  One important advantage is that it might 
be feasible, then, for the statutory duty to apply a single standard across 
domestic and overseas suppliers.  The requirements could not be exactly the 
same, but a single legislative standard would invite agency articulation of 
domestic and overseas standards that are roughly comparable. 
A duty to contract with suppliers whose factories meet articulated 
standards is based more in strict liability than in fault.  Showing a violation 
of the duty would not require showing any negligence on the part of the lead 
firm whose liability is at issue, though it does imply negligence by the 
supplier.159  Nor would liability turn on the occurrence of injury.  Again, one 
of the advantages of agency enforcement is that it can avoid the distortion of 
standing and evidentiary requirements of private adjudication, which could 
cause firms to attend disproportionately to easily detectable, substantial 
injuries. 
Like enforcement activity, we can expect the standards that agencies adopt 
to be suboptimal.160  But a strict liability standard—effectively, a duty to 
succeed in one’s choice of appropriate suppliers—will reduce the costs of 
adjudicating individual cases, including the high error rate that follows from 
opaque and highly manipulable judgments about whether a given firm’s 
efforts were reasonable.  Well-resourced firms can always muster evidence 
in favor of weak, fault-based conduct standards, and they will largely control 
evidence of their own conduct.  By contrast, administrative liability that turns 
on identification of a noncompliant factory requires far less factual inquiry.  
Moreover, the question of liability will turn entirely on facts outside the firm 
whose liability is at issue; those facts can be evidenced without 
 
 159. Cf. Cynthia Estlund, Corporate Self-Regulation and the Future of Workplace 
Governance, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 617, 625 (2009) (suggesting that firms’ liability for 
wrongdoing be reduced where they have maintained an adequate system of self-policing and 
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 160. See Michael E. Levine, Regulatory Capture, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 267 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).  But see Richard A. Posner, 
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 337–39 (1974). 
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documentation from the lead firm.  Much like employment agencies in the 
United States are assisted by unions and other worker organizations that 
report workplace violations, an agency charged with enforcing production 
liability may be assisted by NGOs that report workplace violations by 
suppliers.  The agency would only need to verify noncompliance and to 
identify the lead firms supplied by the noncompliant site before it issued fines 
to those firms. 
The literal distance between wrongdoer and the site of wrongdoing raises 
the thorny question of responsibility to which this Article has been addressed, 
but it also makes it harder for a lead firm to evade liability were a regime of 
legal liability to be enacted. 
CONCLUSION 
The lesson of products liability is that privity and fault must be relaxed as 
we update our systems of liability to meet the needs of new market structures.  
In the context of employment, as was earlier the case in consumer law, radical 
deference to contract should give way to a more liberal, tort-like system—
albeit not one based in the common law of tort. 
Of course, not everyone agrees that products liability was a success.161  
And we cannot be certain about how industries will respond to production 
liability.  For example, production liability could result in disaggregation at 
the top of the supply chain due to the advantages conferred on smaller, less 
salient lead firms.162  This seems unlikely, given how central brand 
recognition is to the garment industry and many other industries, but it is not 
theoretically impossible.  It is, though, practically impossible to persist with 
the present lawless regime.  Production liability is the only viable way for the 
state to govern certain workplaces.  We need to identify the model of 
production liability most likely to effectuate the moral standards to which we 
are already committed. 
 
 161. See generally, e.g., Richard Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. 
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